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1 Abstract  
Network communications represent an easy means for the spread of viruses. Internet users are constantly 
threatened by the spread of new viruses hidden in appealing objects such as jokes, games, chats, and e-mails 
ostensibly sent by friends. Although e-mail and www systems represent the main "open doors", floppy and 
CD disks are still minor "contributors". 
The damage provoked by infections can be very costly for an organization's time and resources and can 
become critical when it affects sensitive systems and data. A basic rule in computer security is to make 
frequent backups to avoid any kind of data destruction or corruption. 
Various countermeasures can be applied to prevent infections, such as activating an anti-virus SW, or setting 
filter rules on the e-mail server in order to discard dangerous files present in the message. Another important 
factor is the awareness of the problem: users must become familiar with both risks and elementary defense 
techniques (i.e. do not open executable files, disable automated macro activation, etc.).  
In this work we present data statistics of virus attacks revealed by an anti-virus SW activated on our e-mail 
server and discuss results in terms of virus types and temporal distribution.  
The work is organized into two parts. The first part includes a brief overview of virus types (parasitic, macro, 
etc.) and main defense techniques; the second shows the results of our experimentation.  
 
2 Virus overview 
The term "computer viruses" refers to programs designed to spread themselves by infecting executable files, 
system areas, hard or floppy disks, etc. without the user's knowledge. In addition to the self-replication 
activity viruses can perform 'bad' actions (payloads) ranging from mild disturbance (annoying the user with 
silly messages) to provoking damage or outright disaster (e. g. deleting or corrupting files, performing Denial 
of Service (DoS) attacks, etc.).  
A computer is infected when a copy of the virus resides in the machine. Once the virus is loaded into the 
memory it can run in background and start to replicate itself. If the infected computer is on the network the 
infection will propagate very quickly to other machines. This process can be interrupted only by detection 
and elimination of the virus.  
The best-known virus types are: 
• Parasitic. Parasitic viruses (or file viruses) are code fragments that reproduce by attaching themselves to 
executable files. When the user starts the infected program, the virus is launched first and then, in order 
to hide its presence, it triggers the original program to be opened. The parasitic virus acquires the same 
rights as the original program and thus is able to self-replicate, and releasing its payload.  
• Worm. An Internet worm, unlike a virus, does not infect other program files but uses computer networks 
and takes advantages of SW bugs to replicate itself. A worm scans the network for another system 
having one specific security hole (such as buffer overflow), and copies itself into the new machine (via 
e-mail, Internet Relay Chat, etc.) and then continues the self-replication process. Thus it has the ability to 
self-replicate incredibly quickly. Furthermore, the worm can release a payload such as to schedule a 
distribute DoS (Denial of Service) attack toward a target system or network. 
• Trojan Horses. A Trojan horse is a program which hides malicious code under appealing shapes i.e. it 
claims to do something "cool" or useful while actually provoking damages. Trojan horses are not 
designed to replicate automatically. 
• Macro. Macro virus is one of the most common types of viruses for various reasons: it requires little 
skill to write; many common applications (word processing, spreadsheet, presentation, etc.) make use of 
macros; and lastly, documents (such as reports, slides, etc.) are frequently exchanged between users. 
Macro viruses are self-replicating macros which can become active if the user opens, closes or saves an 
infected document. However recent versions of these macro-enabling applications display an alert 
concerning macro-virus risks and permit disabling of macro execution. 
• Boot sector. A boot sector virus infects computers by modifying the contents of the boot sector program, 
replacing the legitimate contents with the infected version. This type of virus can only infect a machine if 
it is used to boot the system up. These viruses no longer represent a threat since operating systems now 
protect the boot sector, and floppy disks are actually unusable for storing modern (and large-size) 
applications.   
• Hoaxes. We also mention hoaxes, which not are actually viruses but simply messages containing false 
information (usually alarming!) and/or instruction in pseudo-technical language inducing unskilled 
people to perform actions, which can provoke some damage. The user is often instigated to send this 
message to everyone in its address book. The result is an Internet chain letter, which provokes a flood of 
unnecessary emails and wastes bandwidth.  
Although the main platform for spreading virus is Windows, due to its widespread diffusion, possible 
infection vectors and vulnerabilities are also present in Unix (which registered a noticeable increase for 
"open source" versions), Macintosh, and openVMS systems. 
The virus trend in the few past years shows that the macro and boot viruses are decreasing greatly whereas 
executables and worms, reflecting the mutation of the network habitat conditions, represent a new threat. The 
CERT/CC annual report for the year 2001 includes worms and DoS in the most common intruder activities 
and also underlines the increasing threat of attacks against or using DNS and routers [1], [2].  
2.1 Infection and Prevention 
The main vehicle for spreading viruses is the Internet: millions of interconnected networks and systems 
represent a fertile ground for electronic infections. Potentially, today the Internet represents the main source 
of information as well as a powerful communication medium. The World Wide Web permitted unskilled 
people to easily use computer systems and greatly influenced the economy by changing ways of doing 
business, but also poses some security risks. Viruses can be hidden in email attachments and in apparently 
innocent applications directly downloadable from the Internet. 
Also, if operating system and application safeguards are increasing, viruses continue to spread. Many factors 
contribute to facilitating the propagation of viral infections including the following [3]: 
• The Internet was designed to favor simplicity and reliability when communication media were unstable, 
and to be open (i.e. fully interoperable), but basic protocols do not included native security mechanisms. 
In addition, the ability to attack a system depends on the 'global' security of the Internet: a DoS attack for 
instance takes advantage of other weakness points in the network. 
• Software bugs represent potential security holes used by hackers to penetrate the systems. The growing 
request for new applications and the short time-to-market requirements impose very short deadlines, 
which can reduce software quality and reliability. The number of vulnerabilities reported to CERT is 
constantly increasing (doubled respect the previous year).   
• Viruses and in general attack tools became more sophisticated, increasing the level of automation, the 
modularity and the speed of replication (the infection is very active). Polymorphic viruses change 
dynamically creating different instances in order to make detection from anti-virus SW more difficult. 
They can use different encryption schemes and functions, vary the command sequence, etc.  In addition 
the use of protocols such as HTTP or IRC which generate high and heavy traffic require many resources 
to efficiently analyze data and discern between legitimate and fraudulent traffic. As a consequence it 
becomes harder to prevent and avoid attacks. 
• Active contents. This term refers to technologies such as Java, ActiveX, Javascript, etc. that can activate 
the dynamic execution of programs or code, client side. These languages offer many advantages such as 
decreasing the web server load (by moving the execution overhead from server to clients) and 
simplification of user interfaces. The problem is that malicious code may be hidden in the downloaded 
SW (i.e. to take advantage of browser's vulnerabilities). Although digital signature can be associated 
with active content (i.e. a signed applet) assuring content integrity and origin authentication, there is no 
guarantee that this SW will not provoke any damage [4]. 
• User ignorance concerning security risks and mechanisms, joint to increasing automation of applications 
(designed to facilitate user interaction) play a fundamental role in virus propagation. For instance, a large 
number of infections are propagated via email: the virus replicates itself by automatically mailing its 
copies to addresses contained in the user's address book. The user double-clicks on an attachment 
starting the application associated with its MIME type (Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions [5], [6]), 
thus enabling the virus to infect. Worse, some old versions of e-mail clients, in order to make the process 
more friendly, automatically triggered the application execution on message reception (default option), 
thus improving the virus' infection power.  
However a few basic norms can contribute to reducing virus infection risks and/or to limiting their damages. 
Computer viruses usually act with the unwitting cooperation of the user. A fundamental component is to 
have the basic skill to deal with the problem as well as the full awareness of our behavior. The use of basic 
norms throughout the organization can contribute to a very effective anti-virus technique: 
• First of all: to invest in education, making users security-aware. User education plays a fundamental role 
in preventing infections. Many viruses are activated by user willingness: double-clicking e-mail 
attachments, downloading files from the Internet, etc. People are curious and the are strongly tempted to 
try new tools or applications. Some guidelines include: 
- Do not trust file extensions. Fake extensions can be attached to executable files in order to trick the 
user (ie. XXX.VBS.TXT or XXX.YYY.EXE.COM).  
- When not necessary, disable all forms of automatic script or program start-ups such as Active and 
Java scripting; 
- If possible, exchange documents in printable formats i.e. PDF or PS, or in formats which do not 
contain macros such as Rich Text Format (RTF) instead of MS Word files, when they need to be 
modified;  
- Do not use self-extracting files that do not show archive content; 
- Report any virus alarm to the security administrator who can discern between genuine and false 
information (hoaxes); 
- Set the PC to boot from drive C thus eliminating the effectiveness of boot sector viruses.  
• Define a security policy ad hoc for your organization, including network monitoring and traffic control 
[7]. The use of anti-virus software is only one component of an effective security policy, which in large 
organizations whose work is based on the net (i.e. e-commerce and e-business companies) requires a 
thorough and accurate analysis and evaluation, which are beyond the scope of this paper. However, at 
the very least one should:  
- block the transfer of executable files (i.e. EXE, VBS, etc.) on the Internet gateway and/or e-mail 
server; 
- put DNS and routers in security (i.e. enabling only authorized ports); 
- run and maintain update anti-virus software in order to detect, report and, when possible, disinfect 
viruses; 
- read security bulletins and rapidly apply new patches to OS and/or applications; 
- have fully effective backup procedures for systems, applications and data, in order to retrieve safe 
copies, in case of virus attack. 
2.2 Anti-virus 
Today the market offers a large set of sophisticated anti-virus strategies [8]. However, basic anti-virus 
techniques include [3]: 
• Scanners that perform detection and disinfection of all known viruses (virus signature based systems). 
They are easy to use and furnish info about virus and infected files. The main problem is that to remain 
effective they must be constantly updated. 
• Checksummers rely on detecting changes: if a virus infects an object then it changes. The main 
disadvantage is that they only detect infection but are unable to prevent it. In addition, the output of 
checksummers must usually be evaluated by skilled persons to distinguish between legitimate and viral 
changes.  
• Heuristics anti-virus software applies rules to detect viruses. However heuristic analysis remains 
effective only if new viruses are a re-make of an existing one (i.e. if it uses the same method of 
replication), otherwise the rules (and thus the SW) need to be updated. In addition heuristic software can 
mistakenly label objects as viruses that are not, thus generating 'false alarms'.  
The anti-virus SW and/or content filtering can be set up in strategic positions where the Internet traffic 
naturally flows, such as a point of access of network perimeter:  
• Internet/intranet gateways or routers or firewalls or proxies. On the connection points between the 
internal networks and the Internet it is possible to check all incoming and outgoing traffic, as they 
represent possible virus entry points. Depending on the network's architecture, the use of anti-virus 
software or filter rules at this level (i.e. discard traffic on unauthorized ports) could be a way to catch or 
stop the virus before it enters in the network and infect the systems. The main problem at this level is 
that encrypted files are not interpretable in transit but only upon arrival at the final destination and the 
inspection of traffic content means loading the CPU with an additional overhead that, if consistent, could 
slow down the data transit. 
• E-mail servers. The anti-virus SW on the e-mail server permits scanning of every incoming and 
outgoing message (i.e. each MIME part composing the message) and removal of infected parts. Also in 
this configuration encrypted files are not interpretable in transit. 
• Servers. If the organization utilizes centrally stored shared information (i.e. groupware server) the anti-
virus SW can run on this server, thus reducing the network traffic in comparison to a client-side 
distributed solution. 
• User system. Virus scanning on the client side is very important: if the virus penetrates the Internet 
gateway and/or firewall and overcomes the server scanner, it could be intercepted on the user system. In 
addition it must not be forgotten that a user desktop can represent a direct point of access for viruses, if 
he/she accesses an infected file on CD or floppy disk. However anti-virus SW in a user desktop can 
create problems such as late program execution when the scanning is active. Another drawback of this 
solution, also considering the increasing use of mobile computers, and the high number of clients in large 
organizations, is to keep the anti-virus software updated.  
In large and complex networks an anti-virus multi-layered approach (e.g. using the anti-virus in all points of 
access) can be adopted, in order to compensate for the weak points of one layer with the strength of another. 
However, given that virus scanning shows limitations in detecting new viruses, this approach results 
ineffective if each layer preserves the same weakness. Therefore different contra-measures must be applied 
in order to build protection levels with different features [9].  
2.3 Damages of virus attack 
Virus penetration can occur when the anti-virus is unable to recognize a new virus. It is difficult to evaluate 
the costs that a company must sustain to recover damages because they depend on many factors such as virus 
penetration, value of the corrupted data, recovery capacity of the organization, nature of company business, 
etc. Damages are not only quantifiable in terms of money but can include:  
• time and resources necessary for disinfecting systems and restoring data and applications;  
• work time lost until systems are restored; 
• eventual interruption of network connectivity and therefore possible loss of revenue;  
• decreased credibility for customers;   
• violated confidentiality and possible stolen information. 
To these factors must be added the psychological factor that induces persons afraid of contracting viruses to 
be removed from newsgroups and mailing lists.  
To give an idea of the global economic impact we only report data from Computer Economics, which 
estimated the full impact of Code Red to be 2.6 billion dollars [10].  
Therefore, in order to limit damages, it is very important for large companies to detect and eradicate the 
infection as soon as possible, in order to restore systems and data. 
3 Anti-virus on e-mail server 
The following section presents virus statistics collected by our e-mail server where an anti-virus SW has 
been active since August 2001. Before, we simply set up rules in our e-mail server in order to block 
potentially dangerous files such as executable or known viruses (on the base of name or MIME type). 
However, the increasing number of new viruses and the need for a more reliable content filtering process, led 
us to adopt an anti-virus SW, to automate and simplify this task.  
Since the effectiveness of anti-virus software depends on frequent updates, its administration is of critical 
importance. For distributing updates can be used pushing, pulling or mixed techniques. We chose automatic 
updating, which does not lead to any workload, although it is rarely used since an organization often prefers 
to maintain full control over any software installed. In addition our users are free to use an anti-virus or not 
on their PCs but updates are their responsibility. 
Although the server manages only one thousand accounts with relatively low traffic, results are nonetheless 
significant.  
Figure 1 represents the temporal distribution of infected MIME parts vs total inspected. We chose to 
substitute each infected part with a short message (text/plain part) reporting info such as virus name, file size, 
MIME type/subtype. Figure 2 shows incoming and outgoing infected parts. 
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From August 1, 2001 until April 30, 2002 the SW examined 338442 MIME parts (with an average value of 
37604 per month). A total of 15255 parts resulted infected by 48 different types of virus, with an average of 
1695 per month, corresponding to 4,42 %.  
An interesting data is provided by the MIME types/subtypes of infected parts1: distribution [Fig. 3], and 
percentage [Fig.4].  
1 August values are not available. Inspection of text/html parts has been active only in October. 
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Last, Figure 5 and Figure 6 show respectively temporal distribution and percentage of well-known viruses. 
Recent attacks have used sophisticated techniques combining worm-like propagation with Denial of Service 
activities, thus producing fast-spreading infections that cause enormous damage. Red Code, for instance, 
infected more than 250,000 systems in just 9 hours on July 19, 2001 [2]. The strong penetration of these 
types of attacks shows that anti-virus software is not effective and must be integrated with other technologies 
such as anti-intrusion and survivability techniques. In particular, survivability, i.e. the ability of systems to 
preserve essential services in the presence of an adverse environment (i.e. in case of attacks or failures) in 
unbounded environments, such as the Internet, is an open research topic [11]. 
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In September 2001 we received an alert that a system in our network, was scanning the Internet for potential 
vulnerabilities: in fact, the Code Red Worm had infected one of our systems (running MS IIS Servers). At 
this time we were using a transparent web caching architecture, thus all web traffic generated from our 
network was transparently intercepted and redirected (via router) toward a cache system. To detect the IP 
address of the infected system (hidden by the cache server), we needed to analyze the cache log files 
(containing the HTTP requests with the virus footprint). Actually, in order to respect Italian privacy law, we 
had anonymized log files (masking IP addresses of stations), so we first needed to change the cache server 
configuration to later detect the address of the infected system and patch it [12]. 
This incident confirmed the previous observation (§2.1): in Internet the system exposure to attacks depends 
on the state of security of the rest of the network [2].  
4 Conclusion 
Hackers and cyber-criminals who cause viral infection can be prosecuted under criminal law for their 
destructive behavior and sentenced [13]. Depending on national or international legislation, the inadvertent 
transmission of viruses, e.g. through an infected e-mail attachment, or by means of unprotected servers, may 
also be subject to civil prosecution. 
In spite of this, the creation and spread of viruses is growing at an alarming rate and their degree of 
automation and sophistication is rapidly increasing. As technologies improve vulnerabilities are also on the 
rise, introducing security issues for handhelds and mobile phones.  
Today, there is no way to implement a totally secure policy but it necessary to create a strategy and use 
combined technologies to fend off intruder attacks and combat the virus plague.  
Costs sustained from the organization for defining and setting up a security policy represent a valuable 
investment for the future. 
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